RAF drew up plans to bomb Argentina during Falklands War

The political ramifications of such a raid were also unpredictable. The attorney general at the time, Sir Michael Havers, later Lord Havers, was believed to have opposed any attack on Argentina itself.

Undertaking such an operation would have been fraught with diplomatic risk. British aircraft were unable to cross Brazilian, Paraguayan or Uruguayan airspace but just two weeks after the plans were drawn up, a Vulcan taking part in the sixth Black Buck raid was forced to land in Rio de Janeiro after its refuelling probe broke.

The Vulcan was carrying secret, US-supplied anti-radar missiles, one of which remained stuck on the aircraft despite efforts to jettison it at sea. Britain had to negotiate with Brazil’s military junta for the aircrew’s release, while pressure was placed on the Brazilian government not to reveal the secret of the missile or that Washington was supporting British efforts.

Documents from the war released in 2012 under 30-year secrecy rules showed that Downing Street had looked into the diplomatic impact of any bombing raids on Argentina and feared that they might “gravely damage” international support for the UK.

While the attacks were ultimately never given the go-ahead, the Argentinian government did fear the possibility of strikes at home, following Operation Black Buck, said Sir Lawrence, and as a result held back some of its most capable fighter jets to defend its home bases.

That helped British forces in their efforts to secure control of the skies over the islands and to provide close air support to soldiers and marines on the ground.